Traffic from the VPN server is processed in reverse order. The kernel does a routing table lookup again, finds the route towards the VPN server over the regular network interface, fills in your LAN IP address (because that's what its source address selection algorith spit out) as source address and routes it out of your LAN interface where it travels from router to router until it reaches the VPN server. Then it hands over the packet to the kernel again for further delivery. Destination IP address is the VPN server. When it receives traffic it creates a new UDP packet (payload = the received packet), encrypts it and places it into a new IP packet. It will also fill in the source address (if its not already set) according to its source address selection algorithm which is normally your local tunnel endpoint address.īehind that tunnel interface your VPN application is listening. The kernel will perform a route lookup for the destination address and will find out that it should be handed over to the tunnel interface for further processing. This vulnerability is due to a race condition in the signature verification process for. When an application creates an IP packets it fills in the destination IP address and hands it over to the kernel for delivery. A vulnerability in the shared library loading mechanism of Cisco An圜onnect Secure Mobility Client for Linux and Mac OS could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform a shared library hijacking attack on an affected device if the VPN Posture (HostScan) Module is installed on the An圜onnect client.
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